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CONFLICT BETWEEN STATE LEGAL
NORMS AND NORMS UNDERLYING
POPULAR BELIEFS: WITCHCRAFT IN
AFRICA AS A CASE STUDY*
I. INTRODUCTION
Beliefs about the causation of life and death, fortune and
misfortune, and good and evil change over time. Often, these beliefs
are based on different concepts of human agency—concepts that have
important implications for views on responsibility, culpability, and
liability. As normative orientations change, societies undergo periods
of profound transformation, and social and interpersonal tensions
often develop in the process.
One example of this phenomenon is the friction that results when
norms underlying popular beliefs are at odds with emerging state
legal norms. People might feel that new standards of behavior
established by the courts are difficult to comprehend. They may
sense that these rules apply retroactively without prior notification—
in essence, they may perceive the standards as “foreign.” During this
transition period, judges face hard choices in establishing what is
“fair” under such emerging legal norms.
Examining judicial decisions where norms underlying popular
beliefs clash with emerging state legal norms provides a window on
how courts negotiate periods of major belief change. It is instructive
to evaluate how judges in developing countries address these
problematic issues, and to specifically identify the types of legal
reasoning judges employ in attempting to integrate different value
systems into a coherent rule of law.
This article treats African disputes about witchcraft as a case
study of the conflict between state legal norms and norms underlying
popular beliefs. The aim is to examine how these disputes challenge
judges to produce fair outcomes when legal cultures clash and to
* The author thanks Professor Jennifer Widner of the University of Michigan for her
feedback and guidance. Additionally, he thanks Professor Doriane L. Coleman of Duke
University School of Law, and the staff of the Duke Journal of Comparative & International
Law, especially Hugh Hollman and Lisa Hix, for their comments.
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profile and explore responses judges have offered. This article
questions how judges should address cases in which norms underlying
popular beliefs conflict with state legal norms by specifically focusing
on judicial reasoning in criminal cases involving witchcraft.1 Parts II–
IV examine how judges have addressed spectral evidence, witchcraft
as the basis for a defense of provocation, and imputations of
witchcraft. Part V summarizes the findings of the previous three
Parts, and suggests, based on these findings, effective ways for judges
to handle cases involving witchcraft.
The author combed the law reports of several common law
African countries for cases involving witchcraft. The author’s original
intent was to trace trends in the way judges decide these cases. Thus,
the author initially sought to explore changes in the form of legal
reasoning over time within several legal systems (specifically
Botswana, Cameroon, Kenya, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa,
Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe). Unfortunately, because law
reporting has broken down in some of these countries and some new
law reports are currently incomplete, it is difficult to clearly define
these trends. Nonetheless, the available cases suffice for sketching
the types of judicial reasoning employed in cases involving witchcraft.
Across large parts of the African continent, beliefs in witchcraft
2
have “run amuck.” According to Robert B. Seidman, “[i]n Africa, as
in Europe, witchcraft superstition seemingly flourishes in times of
3
social instability.” The appearance of cases involving witchcraft
appear to have increased, and they illustrate one challenge many
African countries face.
Modern African states generally do not see witchcraft as
legitimate, although they usually stop short of criminalizing popular
beliefs in witchcraft. In contrast, legislative acts criminalizing the
practice of witchcraft originate in the colonial era, and independent
governments have not removed these statutes—and many continue to
enforce them. For example, both South Africa and Zimbabwe’s
Witchcraft Suppression Acts make it a crime to accuse someone of
1. This article discusses one civil case, K. Hassani v. Kithuku & Chali, 1985 TLR 212 (HC)
in Part II.B.3, infra, as an example of how judges address spectral evidence in cases involving
witchcraft. This case is included because the author located few published cases involving
spectral evidence. As the court noted, the Hassani case could have been tried as a criminal case
under Tanzania's Witchcraft Ordinance of 1928 (Ch. 18 of the Laws of Tanzania), because it
involved the practice of witchcraft. Id. at 216.
2. Peter Geschière & Cyprian F. Fisiy, Domesticating Personal Violence: Witchcraft,
Courts and Confessions in Cameroon, 64 AFRICA 323, 324 (1994).
3. PARRINDER, WITCHCRAFT: EUROPEAN AND AFRICAN 205 (1958).
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being a witch.4 According to Tanzania’s Witchcraft Ordinance,
anyone who is caught practicing witchcraft, or who possesses
5
witchcraft materials, can be charged with an offense. Under Section
251 of the Cameroon Penal Code:
Whoever commits any act of witchcraft, magic or divination liable
to disturb public order or tranquility, or to harm another in his
person, property or substance, whether by taking a reward or
otherwise, shall be punished with imprisonment for from two to ten
years, and with a fine of five thousand to one hundred thousand
6
francs.

A. Significance
This note is significant because it provides insight into the effects
of a clash between norms underlying popular beliefs and state legal
norms. Alan Watson, a scholar on legal transplants, presents three
tests to evaluate the utility of a source of law or method of
lawmaking: (1) responsiveness of the law to serious needs and desires
of a community; (2) comprehensibility of the law by the people who
are affected by it; and (3) comprehensiveness of the law in providing
7
certain answers to legal problems. Watson argues:
The more easily a source of law allows law to change when society
undergoes change, the better the source of law. . . . The more
comprehensible the law, the more satisfactory the source of law. . . .
The more certainly the existing law can provide an answer to the
8
legal problems that arise, the more satisfactory is the source of law.

Thus, a lack of responsiveness, comprehensibility, and comprehensiveness makes the law less familiar to, and less accessible by, the
community it serves, essentially rendering the law ineffective.
Further, “[a] law that fails to take into account the social ethos of the

4. §1(a) Witchcraft Suppression Act No. 3 of 1957 (amended in 1997) (South Africa); §3
Witchcraft Suppression Act of 1890 (Ch. 9:19) (amended in 2001) (Zimbabwe); §4 Witchcraft
Ordinance of 1928 (Ch. 18 of the Laws of Tanzania) (amended in 1956).
5. §3 Witchcraft Ordinance of 1928 (Ch. 18 of the Laws of Tanzania) (amended in 1956).
6. CYPRIAN F. FISIY, PALM TREE JUSTICE IN THE BERTOUA COURT OF APPEAL: THE
WITCHCRAFT CASES 6 (1990). See André Belombé Yombi, La répression de la Sorcellerie dans
le Code Pénal Camerounais: Le cas du Kong dans le Ntem, 5 JAHRBUCH FÜR AFRIKANISCHES
RECHT 3, 3–12 (1986), for a detailed discussion of witchcraft in the Cameroon Penal Code.
7. ALAN WATSON, SOURCES OF LAW, LEGAL CHANGE, AND AMBIGUITY 112 (1984).
Watson discusses these tests in the context of his proposed two-tier method of lawmaking.
Based on Watson's three tests, a "satisfactory" method of lawmaking is one that creates laws
that are familiar to, and accessible by, a community that the law serves. This implies that a
satisfactory method of lawmaking is one that reconciles a conflict between state legal norms and
norms underlying popular beliefs.
8. Id.
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community it is supposed to guide risks being ignored and hence,
9
remaining a dead letter, incapable of inducing change.”
The effect of a conflict between state legal norms and norms
underlying popular beliefs in witchcraft, as seen in several African
countries, is exemplary of Watson’s argument. According to Kenyan
legal scholar Onesmus K. Mutungi, killing a witch “is not only
approved but . . . is also a praiseworthy service in the eyes of” many
10
communities. Thus, the judicial practice of punishing individuals
who kill alleged witches creates a conflict between state legal norms
and norms underlying popular beliefs. This conflict reduces the law’s
effectiveness, as many people believe “that the law is in collusion with
the witches.”11 If the law is more responsive to popular needs to
regulate witchcraft, and if it provides a comprehensive way of
addressing these needs in a manner accessible to the general
population, perhaps the conflict between popular and state legal
norms would be reconciled.
These kinds of challenges extend beyond the boundaries of
witchcraft. For example, norms underlying popular beliefs and state
legal norms clash when immigrants to the United States perform child
12
marriages, which are prohibited by U.S. law. Although it may be
acceptable, even encouraged, in a culture for girls under the age of
eighteen to marry adult men, according to Western cultural and legal
norms, this is prohibited. Immigrants who practice child marriages
potentially face imprisonment, and their children could be taken into
protective custody.13 Thus, the attempt at the reconciliation of
popular and legal norms profiled in this article is useful in other
contexts.
B. Witchcraft
Beliefs in witchcraft take many different forms. In Kenya, for
example, one society’s definitions of witches and witchcraft often
14
differ from those employed in other societies. One common notion
underlying witchcraft is the belief that supernatural forces may be

9. ONESMUS K. MUTUNGI, THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF WITCHCRAFT IN EAST AFRICA WITH
PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO KENYA 104 (1977).
10. Id. at 59.
11. Id.
12. Don Terry, Child Brides in Middle America: Mideast Culture Clashes with the Law,
INT’L HERALD TRIBUNE, December 3, 1996, at 11.
13. Id.
14. MUTUNGI, supra note 9, at xviii.
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used as a means to achieve a personal goal (e.g., harm, profit,
fertility). In other words, “[w]itchcraft beliefs embrace[] a wide range
of ideas, practices, and motivations, but in their various forms they
usually share[] the idea that the power to inflict injury and benefit
15
could be exercised through unobservable, supernatural means.”
Beliefs in witchcraft are often used to explain fortunes and
misfortunes, good and evil, and life and death. According to
Mutungi:
In the so-called civilized communities, inexplicable eventualities
and misfortunes are attributed to fate, bad luck, or the will of God.
The native African seeks his explanation in witchcraft. What must
be noted, though, is that in both communities, the struggle is the
16
same—a search for causal explanation for misfortunes.

In many African societies, “every evil and misfortune that is
17
incapable of rational explanation is attributed to witchcraft.”
According to the group Research on Poverty Alleviation (REPOA),
belief in witchcraft “[t]akes its origin . . . in the psychological need to
provide an outlet for repressed hostility, frustration and anxiety. It
provides a way to explain serious misfortunes and render those who
suffer them blameless in the eyes of society.”18
By attributing “inexplicable eventualities” and misfortunes to
supernatural forces, the belief in witchcraft does not appear strikingly
different from many of the world’s major religions. However, unlike
major religions, witchcraft is difficult to define “because it is not a
19
Witchcraft attributes supernatural
coherent body of beliefs.”
powers to a human being, either through ascribing these attributes to
a pact with the devil, similar to accusations made in New England
during the Salem Witch Trials, or through other means. When
deciding cases involving witchcraft during the 1930s, Sudanese courts
arrived at
a very strange dichotomy. Killing a human being, believing him to
be a ghost or supernatural creature, is not an offense, and yields an
acquittal. Killing a human being with supernatural powers [i.e., a
witch] even if he is believed to have used them to bewitch the

15. JENNIFER WIDNER, BUILDING THE RULE OF LAW 380 (2000).
16. MUTUNGI, supra note 9, at 105.
17. Id. at xvii.
18. Gender and Witchcraft Killings in Tanzania, Dar es Salaam: TOMRIC Agency, March
27, 2000, available at http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/200003270107.html (on file with Duke
Journal of Comparative and International Law).
19. MUTUNGI, supra note 9, at xviii.
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defendant, constitutes murder, and merits the death penalty or life
20
imprisonment.

This demonstrates the potential complexity of cases involving
witchcraft. Witchcraft challenges ideas of human agency. For
example, an alleged witch may be viewed either as a supernatural
being or a human being with supernatural powers. If judges choose
to determine how a defendant perceives a witch, a conviction of
murder could be reduced if the defendant intended to kill a
supernatural being and not a human being with supernatural powers.
Based on the cases discussed in this article, most African beliefs in
witchcraft involve the perception that a witch is a human being with
supernatural powers.
Disputes involving witchcraft arrive at courts in several ways. In
only a few places today are there still trials of people accused of
practicing witchcraft, although legislation such as the Witchcraft
Suppression Acts long ago made it possible to punish people who
openly practice witchcraft or accuse others of doing so.
Recently, judges in southeastern Cameroon have meted out
harsh sentences to accused witches who confess to practicing
witchcraft.21 This judicial treatment is contrary to local community
norms. Communities often rehabilitate people who confess to
practicing witchcraft by neutralizing their powers and re-socializing
them.22
In South Africa and Zimbabwe, accusations of witchcraft
brought to courts often come in the form of “imputations” of
witchcraft. According to S. v. Mmbengwa, imputing means something
23
more than mere naming. Imputation “can take any form as long as
it is clear to the unbiased beholder that the intention to attribute a
certain characteristic exists in the mind of the imputor which finds
expression in some act or attitude.”24 Imputations of witchcraft are

20. LEO KATZ, BAD ACTS & GUILTY MINDS: CONUNDRUMS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 169
(1987). See KRISHNA VASDEV, THE LAW OF HOMICIDE IN THE SUDAN (1978), for more
information on cases involving witchcraft in Sudan.
21. These confessions could be coerced, as "[i]t is . . . extremely difficult to get a clear
picture of how interrogations are conducted by the gendarmes. No law officer ever admits to
any beatings or torture. Yet, some have raised such claims during trials." FISIY, supra note 6, at
27.
22. FISIY, supra note 6, at 25.
23. 1988 (3) SA 71, 73 (VSC).
24. Id. at 73.
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essentially a type of defamation, and they are criminalized in many
25
African societies through legislation prohibiting acts of witchcraft.
In Tanzania, the courts have reviewed several cases involving the
killing of alleged witches. In these cases, defendants employ genuine
belief in witchcraft as a defense to murder and manslaughter. In
other words, defendants argue that the deceased’s threats or actions
allegedly involving witchcraft are argued to constitute such
provocation that the defendant killed the deceased in the heat of
passion. Part III of this article examines whether judges follow a
particular standard of reasonableness when deciding these cases.
Beliefs in witchcraft are prominent on the African continent, and
witch killings are alarmingly high. For example, in Tanzania
approximately four hundred alleged witches were killed between 1997
and 2000 in the western part of the country, mainly among the
26
Sukuma ethnic group. Also, reports in other regions “in the western
part of Tanzania[] show that more than 500 people, most of them
women, were killed in various witchcraft incidents” over a four-year
period.27
The current challenge presented by popular beliefs in witchcraft
to new normative orientations in Africa is similar to the Western
experience with witchcraft. Before the rise of Christianity, beliefs in
witchcraft existed at the popular level in Europe. Witchcraft was
practiced by “cunning folk,” a term for practitioners of “white
magic.” This type of witchcraft involved the use of charms and
supernatural forces for fortune telling, fertility rituals, healing, “the
casting of spells, the making of storms, converse with spirits, [and]

25. Under Zimbabwe's Witchcraft Suppression Act,
Any person who imputes to any other person the use of non-natural means in causing
any disease in any person or animal or in causing any injury to any person or property,
that is to say, who names or indicates any other person as being a wizard or witch shall
be guilty of an offence and liable to a fine not exceeding level six or to imprisonment
for a period not exceeding one year or to both such fine and such imprisonment.
§3 Witchcraft Suppression Act of 1890 (Ch. 9:19) (amended in 2001).
South Africa's Witchcraft Suppression Act punishes anyone who: "imputes to any other
person the causing, by supernatural means, of any disease in or injury or damage to any person
or thing, or who names or indicates any other person as a wizard." §1(a) Witchcraft
Suppression Act No. 3 of 1957 (amended in 1997). If the imputation of witchcraft results in
someone being killed, "or where the accused has been proved to be by habit or repute a
witchdoctor or witch-finder," the accused can be imprisoned "for a period not exceeding twenty
years." Id.
26. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, ANNUAL REPORT 2000—TANZANIA (on file with Duke
Journal of Comparative and International Law).
27. Gender and Witchcraft Killings in Tanzania, supra note 18.
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sympathetic magic.”28 With the rise of Christianity during the Dark
Ages, popular pagan beliefs in witchcraft were frowned upon and
29
suppressed by the church elite. During the Middle Ages, religious
institutions exploited pagan beliefs in witchcraft, constructing an
“organized, systematic ‘demonology’” that fueled the an anti-witch
frenzy in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.30
According to H. R. Trevor-Roper, witch-hunts in early modern
Europe were an attempt by organized religion to control certain
31
segments of the population by accusing non-conformists of
32
practicing witchcraft. English colonists brought beliefs in witchcraft
to New England, location of the infamous Salem Witch Trials, which
only ended after criticism of the admission of spectral evidence in
trials,33 and after people of high status were accused.34
In Africa, norms underlying beliefs in witchcraft pose a
significant challenge to state legal norms underlying the new
postcolonial normative orientation towards modernization.
In
Cameroon, for example, youths practiced a new form of witchcraft
called gbati, often allegedly “directed against modern elements in the
35
village.” In one case, the practice was directed at a school, and in
another case, it was allegedly used to prevent the construction of a
36
Protestant church. In Cameroon, new trends in beliefs in witchcraft
demonstrate witchcraft’s perceived “leveling impact,” which
purportedly reduces inequalities and as a result poses a threat to
modern forms of authority and wealth.37 Further, in southeastern
Cameroon, accusations of witchcraft are frequently “the result of the

28. H.R. TREVOR-ROPER, THE EUROPEAN WITCH-CRAZE OF THE 16TH AND 17TH
CENTURIES 91 (1978)
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See id. at 106–7.
32. See id. at 108–9.
33. PAUL BOYER & STEPHEN NISSENBAUM, SALEM POSSESSED: THE SOCIAL ORIGINS OF
WITCHCRAFT 18–19 (1974).
34. See MARION L. STARKEY, THE DEVIL IN MASSACHUSETTS, A MODERN INQUIRY INTO
THE SALEM WITCH TRIALS 226 (1969).
35. Cyprian F. Fisiy & Peter Geschière, Judges and Witches, or How is the State to Deal
with Witchcraft? Examples from Southeastern Cameroon, 118 CAHIERS D'ÉTUDES AFRICAINES
135, 141 (1990).
36. Id.
37. Id.

FINAL DIWAN.DOC

2004]

3/8/2005 9:44 AM

WITCHCRAFT: CONFLICT WITH LEGAL NORMS IN AFRICA

359

jealousy and hatred of the rural poor against the younger and more
38
advanced urban based elite.”
The practice of witchcraft has also been used as a device by the
elite to obtain and secure authority. In southeastern Cameroon, the
elite have employed the fear of witchcraft to emphasize their power
over others, and they manipulate “witchcraft beliefs, through the
press and public rumour, to support the otherwise fragile basis of
39
In Tanzania, witchcraft has been used by
[their] authority.”
“government officials [who] undergo ritual[s] believing that they
would get rich or secure power especially [while] . . . campaigning for
the general elections.”40
II. SPECTRAL EVIDENCE
During the Salem Witch Trials in Salem, Massachusetts,
allegedly possessed girls relied on visions to detect the presence of
witches among the general populace. Magistrates admitted these
visions, or specters, of the alleged witches into evidence to imprison
accused witches until they were brought to trial before the infamous
Court of Oyer and Terminer.41 After fasting, prayer, and executions
failed to stop the flurry of witchcraft accusations, Salem inhabitants
42
Increase Mather’s published sermon, Cases of
became uneasy.
Conscience: Concerning Evil Spirits Personating Men, criticized the
use of spectral evidence, and eventually the Court of Oyer and
Terminer was dissolved and the executions ceased.43 A new court that
refused to consider spectral evidence tried accused witches remaining
in prison, and the Salem Witch Trials eventually ended.44
In Salem Possessed: The Social Origins of Witchcraft, Paul Boyer
and Stephen Nissenbaum define spectral evidence as “testimony
about supernatural visitations from some demonic creature . . . who

38. Cyprian F. Fisiy & Michael J. Rowlands, Sorcery and Law in Modern Cameroon, 6
CULTURE & HISTORY 63, 70 (1989).
39. Id. at 83.
40. Witchcraft Notion Creeping in Urban Areas, Dar es Salaam: TOMRIC News Agency,
June 30, 2000 (on file with Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law).
41. See BOYER & NISSENBAUM, supra note 33, at 6; 18–19. The Court of Oyer and
Terminer's "trial records have not survived[;] . . . [therefore,] no one knows how much weight
[the Court] gave to the spectral testimony gathered by the magistrates in their preliminary
investigations." Id. at 19.
42. Id. at 19.
43. Id. at 19–20.
44. Id. at 20.
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appear[s] in the specter (that is, shape) of an accused witch.”45 A
diviner, witch doctor, or in the case of the Salem Witch Trials, a
possessed person, sees the image or specter of an accused witch, and
this “spectral evidence” is seen as confirming the accused as a witch.
One of the main characteristics—and problems—of spectral
evidence is that it cannot be verified, since “specters were usually
visible only to the person or persons for whom the visitation—vision,
really—was intended. Others might be present, but they could see
nothing.”46 In the late seventeenth century, a Scottish prosecutor
argued that “[i]t is part of the witches’ purchase from the devil that
they cannot be seen at some occasions; so that the abominations
committed then would remain unpunished if such witnesses [who
47
offer spectral evidence] were not admitted.” Authorities had to
trust that the possessed person, diviner, or witch doctor did not have
opportunistic motives for providing the spectral evidence. They also
had to trust that the person who provided the spectral evidence did
not make a mistake when identifying a specter or image.
It comes as no surprise then that spectral evidence is viewed with
great skepticism. For example, during the Salem Witch Trials,
“magistrates always took pains to buttress [spectral evidence] where
48
The
they could with other, more empirical forms of evidence.”
admissibility of spectral evidence in cases involving witchcraft during
the Salem Witch Trials highlights the conflict between popular norms
and emerging legal norms. What follows is an examination of spectral
evidence in African cases involving witchcraft, drawing extensively on
sources about the Salem Witch Trials and witch trials in Europe, since
the issue of spectral evidence has not been explicitly discussed in the
literature on law and witchcraft in Africa. Part II.A examines the
potential dangers inherent in the admission of spectral evidence, Part
II.B examines how judges in African countries have addressed the
issue of spectral evidence, while Part II.C attempts to provide a
cogent summary of trends in judges’ reasoning vis-à-vis spectral
evidence.

45. Id. at 16.
46. Id. at 17.
47. James B. Thayer, Trial by Jury of Things Supernatural, in LEGAL ESSAYS 348 (Ezra
Ripley Thayer ed., 1908).
48. BOYER & NISSENBAUM, supra note 33, at 18.
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A. Dangers of Spectral Evidence
Spectral evidence is an unverifiable, intangible, and metaphysical
type of evidence. If judges give significant weight to spectral evidence
when deciding cases, they are essentially placing the fate of an
accused in the hands of a witch doctor or possessed person. There is
no way to ensure that opportunistic motives do not underlie the
allegedly possessed person or witch doctor’s accusation.
The principal victim of spectral evidence is an accused witch. As
seen below, if convicted of being a witch, an accused witch often faces
capital punishment, large fines or imprisonment. If acquitted or
pardoned, an accused witch often faces ostracism, assault, or death.
For example, in her 1703 petition to Massachusetts’ General Court,
Abigail Faulkner states:
When many were accused and Imprisoned att Salem as Witches
and some Executed, my selfe was accused by the afflicted, who
pretended to see me by theire Spectrall Sight (not with theire
bodily eyes) and that I afflicted them, upon whose accusations (and
theirs only) I was Examined, Imprisoned, and brought to tryall.
These being all that gave in any Evidence against me upon Oath,
yet the Jury . . . brought me in guilty, and the Sentence of Death
49
was passed upon me.

Fortunately, Faulkner was pardoned because she filed her petition
during a period when the Salem Witch Trials were ending and
50
spectral evidence was no longer being considered in trials.
Nevertheless, Faulkner suffered as a result of the accusation made
against her. In her petition, she states:
The pardon having Soe farr had its Effect as that I am yet suffered
to live, but this only as a Malefactor Convict upon record of the
most heinous Crimes that mankind Can be Supposed to be guilty
of. Which besides its utter Ruining and Defaming of my
Reputation, will Certainly expose my selfe to Imminent Danger by
New Accusations, which will therby be the more readily believed,
[and] will Remaine as a perpetual brand of Infamy upon my
51
family.

Faulkner’s petition provides a telling case study of how an accusation
of witchcraft often harms the reputation of an accused and is
instructive in our analysis of modern witchcraft controversies in
Africa.

49. CAROL F. KARLSEN, THE SALEM WITCHCRAFT OUTBREAK OF 1692 (manuscript at 35,
on file with author).
50. Id.
51. Id. (manuscript at 35–36, on file with author).
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In southeastern Cameroon, the admission of spectral evidence in
cases involving witchcraft often results in accused witches receiving
harsh sentences of imprisonment and fines. For example, in a case in
Cameroon’s Bertoua Court of Appeal:
[A] fairly rich planter . . . felt that all his richness [sic] were of no
avail. His investments remained without profit. He was especially
worried by the fact that his children, despite all the tuition fees he
paid, never had success at school. Therefore, he went to consult a
witch doctor who saw that a poor neighbour . . . had thrown a spell
on him. The planter, supported by the witch doctor, lodged a
complaint with the gendarmes and the accused, despite all his
52
denials, was sentenced to five years of jail.

In this case, spectral evidence resulted in the accused witch being
sentenced to a lengthy term of imprisonment for an act he denied
committing. While the admission of spectral evidence is unusual in
African courts today, it does occasionally occur.
B. How Judges Address Spectral Evidence
1. Zimbabwe. In the case S. v. Muleya & Others, a group of
family members appealed their fifteen- and twenty-year prison
53
sentences, following their conviction for murder. In this case, three
young children died in “quick succession in unexplained
54
circumstances.” Their mother, Juliet Munkuli, consulted an alleged
spirit medium to determine the cause of her children’s deaths. The
spirit medium held up a mirror. According to the spirit medium, the
image of a male villager appeared in her mirror “carrying the corpse
of one of the dead children. Two further corpses of Juliet’s children
also appeared in [the spirit medium’s] mirror . . . .”55
Juliet’s relatives gathered with other villagers to confront the
man whose image had supposedly appeared in the mirror. At the
gathering, the man admitted that he had caused the death of Juliet’s
children by witchcraft. Juliet’s relatives demanded that he bring them
the muti (or charm) that he had used to kill the children. Escorted by
Juliet’s relatives, the man went home to fetch the muti, and he later
returned to the gathering with his hands bound behind his back,
dragging a sledge. One of Juliet’s relatives was not satisfied that the
52. Fisiy & Geschière, supra note 35, at 143 (first emphasis added) (case citation not
provided by authors).
53. 1982 (2) ZLR 359 (SC).
54. Id. at 360.
55. Id. at 361.
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man had disclosed all his muti, and the relative “demanded that the
[man] produce a certain water bag whose existence was denied by
56
[the man].” The man was then forced to lie on his back, his sledge
was placed on top of him, along with heavy rocks and soon after he
57
was pronounced dead.
In this case, the claim that the victim’s image had appeared in the
spirit medium’s mirror constituted spectral evidence. The judge
commented that the spectral evidence was “mind-boggling and
58
remains unexplained,” and he viewed it with apparent confusion and
perplexity. While the judge did not believe that the spectral evidence
was legitimate or credible, he did not explicitly dismiss it from
consideration. The judge chose not to delve into the issue of spectral
59
evidence, instead opting to leave it “unexplained.”
60
2. South Africa. In R. v. Hlupo, a defendant appealed his
conviction and sentence for violating South Africa’s Witchcraft
Suppression Act by imputing the use of witchcraft to residents of his
village. Based on a statement by his daughter shortly before her
death, the defendant believed that the death was caused by an act of
witchcraft committed by a group of women.61 The defendant
arranged a meeting, and ordered his sons to tell the village gathering
what his daughter told him. At the meeting, a village headman
accused the women of being witches based on the defendant’s claims
and ordered them to leave the village.62
Although the judge in Hlupo dismissed the defendant’s appeal of
his conviction, he permitted the defendant to appeal his sentence.
The judge determined that the defendant believed his daughter’s
statements to be true63 and concluded “that the [defendant] adopted
as his own the imputation of witchcraft which his dying daughter
made, and he adopted it with the object of getting the [accused
women] declared to be witches at this public meeting; and in fact they
were so declared to be witches.”64

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id.
Id. at 361–62.
Id.
Id.
1969 (4) SA 98, 99 (R., A.D.)
Id. at 100.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 101.

FINAL DIWAN.DOC

364

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

3/8/2005 9:44 AM

[Vol 14:351

Although the judge did not explicitly address the use of spectral
evidence by the defendant’s daughter, he recognized that the
defendant believed his daughter’s accusation:
[I]f the whole background of this case is taken into account—the
fact that the [defendant] appears to be a simple tribesman who
genuinely believed that his daughter had been killed by these
witches—then I think . . . that the chances of an appeal against
65
sentence succeeding are significantly good.

Thus, the judge indirectly considered spectral evidence by allowing
the defendant to appeal his sentence, because the defendant
“appeare[d] to be a simple tribesman” who believed his daughter’s
statement that the accused women were witches.
Spectral evidence also appears in an earlier case reported in the
66
South Africa Law Reports, R. v. Maruberera. In this instance, the
accused, an alleged witch doctor, was convicted of unlawfully
67
imputing the use of witchcraft to a man named Sigumba. Sigumba
had consulted the witch doctor in an effort to find out the cause of his
grandchild’s death. The witch doctor claimed he had a vision of a
spirit that emerged from Sigumba who killed the grandchild. As a
means to appease the spirit and cause it to disappear, the witch doctor
encouraged Sigumba to slaughter a goat at the site of the grandchild’s
death. Apparently distressed at the notion that he was somehow
responsible for his grandchild’s death, Sigumba was found dead of an
apparent suicide the day after consulting the witch doctor. As a
result, the state prosecuted the witch doctor for making an unlawful
imputation of witchcraft against Sigumba.
The judge set aside the witch doctor’s conviction and sentence.
The judge reviewed the evidence recounting the witch doctor’s
alleged vision describing the death of Sigumba’s grandchild and found
“that it was the spirit of Sigumba that had killed the child, and, so far
from indicating an identity between the spirit and Sigumba, [the witch
doctor] did rather the opposite.”68 The judge referred to the witch
doctor’s statements encouraging Sigumba to slaughter the goat as a

65. Id.
66. 1968 (1) SA 206 (R.).
67. A witch is a female practitioner of witchcraft and a wizard is a male practitioner of
witchcraft. S. v. Mafunisa, 1986 (3) SA 495, 499 (VSC). See id. for a discussion of the difference
between the terms wizard and witch. Some of the cases the author located do not use the word
wizard when referring to a male practitioner of witchcraft. For the sake of convenience, the
author will use the word "witch" when referring to both male and female practitioners of
witchcraft.
68. Maruberera, 1968 (1) SA at 207.
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means to vanquish the evil spirit, stating: “This, I think, indicates the
lack of identity between the spirit and Sigumba, and the lack of any
active use of non-natural means by Sigumba. It was not even said
that Sigumba was at fault in having failed earlier to appease the
69
spirit.”
After analyzing the witch doctor’s description of his conversation
with Siguma and his alleged vision, the judge determined that
“although it may be some indication that Sigumba’s primitive mind
took the imputation as one of witchcraft, and even one of
responsibility for the child’s death, it is of itself insufficient to bring
70
the charge home to the [witch doctor].” Thus, the witch doctor was
only morally responsible for the Sigumba’s death. The judge believed
it was tragic that Sigumba felt responsible for his grandchild’s death,
because his “primitive mind” misinterpreted the spectral evidence to
mean that he and the spirit shared an identity, but he did not find the
witch doctor legally culpable for Sigumba’s death.71 While it appears
that the judge in this case believed that he had to interpret spectral
evidence to make his decision, he was either unwilling, or did not
consider, bringing in an expert on matters of witchcraft to interpret
such spectral evidence.
3. Tanzania. In the civil case K. Hassani v. Kithuku & Chali,
the plaintiff, an elderly man named Karoyo Hassani, sought damages
for slander by an alleged local witch doctor.72 The defendant had
publicly accused Hassani of practicing witchcraft in front of a large
crowd of assembled villagers. The alleged witch doctor had led the
group to Hassani’s house,73 where he publicly announced: “I will talk
74
about your wizardry so that the people may know about it as well.”
The witch doctor claimed:
that there was a pot in the house which contained witchcraft; that
there was a second pot with two edges in the bed room [sic]; that
the said two edges used to turn into venomous or deadly snakes
which bit people; that there was a small drum in the roof which was
made of female genitals; that its drum stick [sic] was a penis; and
75
that its purpose was for summoning all witches and wizards.

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at 208.
Id.
Id.
1985 TLR 212 (HC).
Id. at 214.
Id.
Id.
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The witch doctor also claimed that “the rice which [Hassani] was
preparing and feeding to people during Maulid celebrations was no
rice at all; it was goats’ droppings, and the meat was not beef at all but
meat of baboons and hyenas.”76 Hassani gave the witch doctor
permission to remove the alleged objects from his house, but the
witch doctor said, “circumstances were not favourable;” and that he
would return the next day.77 The witch doctor then dispersed the
crowd and told them to return the next day.
The judge awarded Hassani 25,000 Tanzanian shillings in general
damages. The judge found the witch doctor defamed Hassani by
claiming that Hassani practiced witchcraft and maintained the
accoutrements of witchcraft in his dwelling. The judge found the
witch doctor’s words were “likely to expose [Hassani] to hatred,
ridicule, or contempt or calculated to injure him in his social standing
78
in his community. Thus, the judge viewed the witch doctor’s words
as placing Hassani at risk of potential harm or death, stressing that
the incident “reveals a somewhat disgusting and absolutely
nauseating episode.”79 Thus, the judge in Hassani addressed the
spectral evidence seriously; rather than openly questioning its
accuracy, he chose to focus on its potential for causing harm. Within
the context of Hassani’s village, such an utterance was seen as
creating a hostile, and potentially dangerous, environment.
4. Cameroon. The following case provides an intriguing
example of the weight given spectral evidence by magistrates in
southeastern Cameroon. When deciding cases involving accusations
of witchcraft, Cameroonian judges tend to rely heavily on spectral
80
evidence provided in the testimony of witch doctors. In Affaire
Medang Jacques & Mpome Moïse c/ Ministère Publique Mpel
Mathurin & Baba Denis,81 the inhabitants of a village “were terrified
by . . . numerous inexplicable deaths . . . , failure in school, and the
82
strange noises that were coming from [a villager’s] residence.” A
renowned witch doctor, Baba Denis, was invited to detect the source
of the misfortunes that plagued the village. Based on his own visions,
76. Id. at 215.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 216.
79. Id. at 213.
80. See FISIY, supra note 6, at 14.
81. FISIY, supra note 6, at 12–13 (discussing Affaire Medang Jacques & Mpome Moïse c/
Ministère Publique Mpel Mathurin & Baba Denis, Arrêt No. 8/COR du 04.10.1983).
82. FISIY, supra note 6, at 12.
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the witch doctor accused two villagers of using witchcraft to cause the
calamities in the village. He led the frightened inhabitants of the
village to the first accused villager’s residence
in order to unmask witchcraft objects. Brandishing a charcoal
pressing iron full of fire in his left hand, [the witch doctor] recited
his incantations in a bid to locate the objects in question. In the
process, he designated [the first accused villager’s] bed as
containing some of the objects. There, a parcel containing hair
from a panther’s upper lip was found, enough to decimate an entire
83
village.

According to the witch doctor,
the unexplained noises were caused by mystical planes taking off
and landing on a mystical landing strip in [the first accused
villager’s] house. [The first accused villager] used these ‘aeronefs
magiques’ with his accomplices to reek [sic] havoc in the
neighbourhood and the neighbouring village. . . . [I]n his bid to
neutralize the landing strip, [the witch doctor] was mystically
attacked by [the first accused villager]. Suddenly, [the witch
doctor] realized that his strength had been drained away. He
almost collapsed and was helped away limping. Later in the day, he
proudly claimed that he had only survived this . . . attack by
84
defeating [the first accused villager] in their mystical fight.

The second accused villager allegedly used “hair from a
panther’s upper lip, enough to decimate an entire village,” to kill the
85
village school’s headmaster. A schoolboy found the panther hair
and presented it to the witch doctor, who claimed that his
86
incantations had caused the boy to find the hair.
Based on the Baba Denis’ testimony and supported by the
physical evidence of the panther’s hair, the two accused villagers were
convicted of practicing witchcraft, in violation of Section 251 of the
Cameroon Penal Code. Both defendants were sentenced to five years
imprisonment and fined 30,000 francs. The first accused villager was
sentenced to pay an additional 40,000 francs in damages to the witch
87
doctor.
The trial of the accused villagers took place in an inquisitorial
civil forum, and the judge appeared to seriously consider the witch
doctor’s spectral testimony without taking into account the accused
villagers’ arguments to the contrary.
According to legal
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 13.
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anthropologist Cyprian F. Fisiy, in southeastern Cameroon “[t]he
judge has as his ultimate guide his conscience—l’intime conviction du
juge (the firm conviction of the judge). When he is satisfied that a
good case has been established, he will not hesitate to convict the
88
defendant” in cases alleging the criminalized practice of witchcraft.
Indeed, witch doctors play a pivotal role in cases involving
accusations of witchcraft, and “[t]heir assertions, especially when
backed by material evidence . . . are readily accepted by the Courts . .
. [located in southeastern Cameroon].”89 In Baba Denis, the judge
viewed the witch doctor’s evidence as conclusive, without considering
the witch doctor’s possible opportunistic motives for making
accusations of witchcraft and providing spectral evidence. According
to Fisiy, “the competence [of witch doctors] is relative and depends
on the apparent gain to be obtained from making or not making such
accusations. For the courts to accept their evidence without critical
scrutiny might be very dangerous for the rights of the accused.”90 This
case is similar to Abigail Faulkner’s petition discussed earlier in Part
II.A, in which the trial judge relied heavily on spectral evidence
provided by an “afflicted” witness describing subconscious visions in
91
arriving at his decision that the accused was a witch.
C. Summary
These cases provide a snapshot that, with the exception of
southeastern Cameroon, African judges tend to view spectral
evidence with a jaundiced eye, and they generally try to avoid
interpreting it. Certain judges in southeastern Cameroon, where
witchcraft norms continue to remain prevalent, generally continue to
92
consider spectral evidence in their decisions. By readily accepting
this spectral evidence, southeastern Cameroonian judges have chosen
to subordinate state legal norms to norms underlying popular beliefs
in local cultures where witchcraft beliefs remain prevalent.
III. REASONABLENESS AND PROVOCATION
In cases involving witchcraft, defendants often claim a “heat of
passion” defense to homicide charges, arguing that they acted to

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. at 31 (translation by author).
Id. at 13.
Id. at 14.
KARLSEN, supra note 49 and accompanying text.
See FISIY, supra note 6, at 31.
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protect themselves against the allegedly provocative behavior of an
accused witch. Defendants argue their provocation was reasonable,
and that consequently, their actions should be excused. Judges
consider the reasonableness of the defendants’ perceptions by asking
whether a reasonable person would have perceived the context of the
action as the defendant did. As such, “reasonableness” becomes a
window into the way judges balance norms underlying popular beliefs
and state legal norms.
A. Provocation in the Common Law
In the sixteenth century, criminal law formally acknowledged
“homicides committed in the course of a sudden quarrel were less
93
culpable than more deliberate felonious homicides.” In 1628, types
of homicide were distinguished. Murder was defined as being
committed with malice aforethought, and manslaughter as being
committed in the “heat of passion caused by adequate provocation.”94
Provocation is defined as “[s]omething (such as words or actions) that
arouses anger or animosity in another, causing that person to respond
in the heat of passion. ‘Adequate’ provocation can reduce a murder
95
charge to voluntary manslaughter.”
In the mid-eighteenth century, the law of provocation “reflected
community norms or value judgments as to the relative degrees of
moral culpability to be assigned to offenders depending upon the
96
These value
circumstances in which they had lost self-control.”
judgments focused on the defendant’s state of mind and the situation
97
in which the homicide occurred. In the mid-nineteenth century,
judgments about what constituted provocation were seen “as a
98
However, in
question of law to be determined by the judge.”
“borderline cases . . . judges began to leave the hard questions to the
jury.”99 The twentieth century “witnessed a progressive relaxation” in
judges making most of the value judgments, with the jury deciding the
100
borderline cases. Thus, “the reasonable man made his appearance

93. Dolores A. Donovan & Stephanie M. Wildman, Is the Reasonable Man Obsolete? A
Critical Perspective on Self-Defense and Provocation, 14 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 435, 446 (1981).
94. Id.
95. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1241 (7th ed. 1999).
96. Donovan & Wildman, supra note 93, at 447.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See E.O. Isedonmwen, A Requiem for Provocation?, 32 J. OF AFR. L. 194, 197 (1988).
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in the criminal law.”101 The reasonable man test was developed to
help juries make decisions in borderline cases. The reasonable man
was allegedly “universal, classless, sexless,” and reflective of
community norms.102 In the early twentieth century, the reasonable
103
man was “a paragon of excellence both physically and mentally.”
As seen in the British case Director of Public Prosecutions v.
Camplin,104 this trend toward reasonableness continued through the
late twentieth century; however, the reasonable man standard has
become much more subjective.
In Camplin, the House of Lords held “[f]or the purposes of the
law of provocation the ‘reasonable man’ was not confined to the adult
male; the expression meant an ordinary person of either sex, not
exceptionally excitable or pugnacious, but possessed of such powers
of self-control as everyone is entitled to expect that his fellow citizens
105
will exercise in society as it was today.” Further, “the ‘reasonable
man’ is a person having the power of self-control to be expected of an
ordinary person of the sex and age of the accused but in other
respects sharing such of the accused’s characteristics . . . [that] would
106
One must
affect the gravity of the provocation to [the accused].”
not only ask whether a reasonable person “would in like
circumstances be provoked to lose his self-control, but would also
react to the provocation as the accused did.”107 Expanding on this
concept, one could argue when a traditional African who genuinely
believes in witchcraft is provoked by a threat of harm by witchcraft,
he or she could be reasonably provoked.
The greater the
provocation, the more likely a person would lose self-control and
react in a fit of rage.
In theory, a trier of fact could use a reasonable traditional
African standard when deciding cases involving witchcraft in which
the defense of provocation is raised, however, it is unlikely that a
defendant accused of killing a person in reaction to a provocative act
based on witchcraft would have his or her punishment reduced simply
because killing a witch is encouraged in the defendant’s community.
Nevertheless, one could argue that the defendant could have his or
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id.
Donovan & Wildman, supra note 93, at 448.
Isedonmwen, supra note 100, at 198.
1978 (2) All E.R. 168 (H.L.).
Id. at 168.
Id. at 169.
Id.
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her conviction reduced from murder to manslaughter if the judge
takes into account that a reasonable person from the defendant’s
community would have acted in the same manner.
According to Ugandan legal scholar Daniel D. N. Nsereko,
[p]rovided that there is an overt physical act of witchcraft, the
courts are at least willing to accept an ordinary person of the
community and background of the accused as the standard for
determining whether or not an act of witchcraft would be sufficient
to deprive a reasonable person of self-control and to induce him to
108
commit the offence [killing out of provocation] in question.

Thus, the general trend is for a subjective standard of reasonableness
to be followed in cases involving witchcraft in which the defense of
provocation is raised. Nsereko concludes that a genuine belief in
witchcraft can
be a partial defence to a murder charge where there has been an
overt and physically provocative act on the part of the victim, to
which the accused retaliates on sudden impulse. This defence is
rarely successfully invoked because witchcraft, being a
metaphysical phenomenon, does not usually manifest itself in overt
109
physical acts.

While there are very few materials available to examine the doctrine
of provocation in the context of witchcraft, the following section
discusses some African cases where the threat of harm by witchcraft
can be seen as a legitimate provocative act.
B. Cases
Examining the defense of provocation in cases involving
witchcraft shows whether judges consider witchcraft a mitigating
factor in their decisions. The extent to which judges consider
witchcraft a mitigating factor depends on whether their reasoning
follows an objective (reasonable person) or subjective (reasonable
traditional African) standard. The reasonableness of a defendant’s
provocation can make a significant difference in the defendant’s
conviction and sentence, however, “idiosyncrasies of individual
temperament or mentality that make a man more easily provoked, or
more violent in his response to provocation, ought not . . . to affect his
liability to conviction, although they may justify mitigation of
sentence.”110 The defense of provocation “merely recognizes the
108. Daniel D. N. Nsereko, Witchcraft as a Criminal Defence, From Uganda to Canada and
Back, 24 MANITOBA L.J. 38, 55 (1996).
109. Id. at 59.
110. Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, Report, Cmd. 8932, para. 143 (1953).
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frailty of man and his proneness to lose self-control under certain
circumstances and thus to do things which he otherwise would not
111
do.”
112

1. Colonial Cases. In Rex. v. Emilio Lumu, a soldier appealed
his conviction for murder. The soldier’s two-year-old nephew died in
his arms after suffering from a brief illness. The soldier’s sister
reported that his father-in-law, a reputed witch doctor named
Sempogo, had fed the child a black powder, which she believed was
“witchcraft medicine” that had killed the child. Upon hearing this,
the soldier went to Sempogo’s home and stabbed him to death.
The court acknowledged the soldier’s genuine belief in
witchcraft, however, it could not “find any support for the proposition
that the excuse of legal provocation could be extended so as to apply
to the facts of this case on the basis that [the soldier] honestly
believed that [Sempogo] had bewitched the child [by feeding it the
113
Instead, the court assumed
black powder] and caused its death.”
Sempogo “poisoned the child by natural means.”114 Since Sempogo
poisoned the child in the soldier’s absence, two days before the
soldier killed Sempogo, Sempogo’s act did not constitute legal
provocation. The court upheld the soldier’s conviction for murder
and rejected his defense of provocation because, according to the
Uganda Penal Code, the provocative act had to be done “in the
presence of an ordinary person . . . who is under [the soldier’s]
immediate care or to whom [the soldier] stands in a conjugal,
parental, filial, or paternal relation.”115
African legal scholars Onesmus K. Mutungi and Daniel D. N.
116
Nsereko both agree Rex. v. Fabiano Kinene & Another “is one of
the few cases in which belief in witchcraft was held to constitute legal
117
provocation.” In this case, a group of villagers suspected a village
headman named William of using witchcraft to kill their relatives.
One night, they found William crawling naked in their compound,
and fearing he was attempting to bewitch them, they killed him by

111. Nsereko, supra note 108, at 50–51.
112. 1946 (13) E. Afr. Ct. App. 144 (appeal taken from Uganda).
113. Id. at 145.
114. Id. at 146.
115. Id. at 146 (quoting Section 199 of the Uganda Penal Code).
116. 1941 (8) E. Afr. Ct. App. 96 (appeal taken from Uganda).
117. Nsereko, supra note 108, at 53; see also MUTUNGI, supra note 9, at 42 (noting "this was
the first instance where a belief in witchcraft fulfilled the legal tenets of provocation").
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forcibly inserting “about twenty raw green bananas into his anus.”118
According to the court, William’s act of crawling naked in the
villagers’ compound at night, and their belief that he was trying to
bewitch them, constituted “grave and sudden provocation.”119 The
court stated:
We think that if the facts proved establish that the victim was
performing in the actual presence of [the villagers] some act which
[they] did genuinely believe, and which an ordinary person of the
community to which [they] belong[] would genuinely believe, to be
an act of witchcraft against him or another person under his
immediate care . . . he might be angered to such an extent as to be
deprived of the power of self-control and induced to assault the
person doing the act of witchcraft. And if this be the case, a
120
defence of grave and sudden provocation is open to him.”

This case explicitly refers to the reasonableness of a defendant’s
belief in witchcraft. It finds the villagers’ provocation by an apparent
act of witchcraft to be reasonable, provided an ordinary and
reasonable person from the villagers’ community would share the
same belief.
In the colonial precedent-setting case Eria Galikuwa v. Rex, the
121
defendant appealed his conviction for murder. The defendant had
hired a reputed witch doctor in the hopes of recovering money stolen
from him. The witch doctor was “an unscrupulous rogue who saw in
[the defendant’s] credulity an opportunity for unjust enrichment.”122
The witch doctor demanded exorbitant fees that the defendant could
not afford, but which he promised to pay in a few days. The witch
doctor threatened his witchcraft medicine would “eat [the defendant]
up” if he did not pay.123 Later, the defendant claimed he heard death
threats emanating from the witch doctor’s medicine.124 As a result,
the defendant killed the witch doctor by beating him with a stick.
The court rejected the defendant’s defense of provocation,
because “a mere threat to cause injury to health or even death in the
125
near future cannot be considered as a physical, provocative act.”
The defendant’s fear of, and genuine belief in, witchcraft was not

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Kinene, 1941 (8) E. Afr. Ct. App. at 98.
Kinene, 1941 (8) E. Afr. Ct. App. at 101.
Id.
1951 (18) E. Afr. Ct. App. 175 (appeal taken from Uganda).
Id. at 175–76.
Id. at 176.
Id.
Id. at 178.
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enough for the court to find his provocation reasonable. The court
found he “was motivated not by anger but by fear alone. He struck,
not in the heat of passion, but in despair arising from the recognition
of his inability to raise the money demanded and his hopeless fear of
the consequences . . . he was not suddenly deprived of his selfcontrol”126
According to the court, the following elements are required for a
successful defense of provocation:
1.

2.

3.

4.
5.

[T]he act causing the death must be proved to have been done
in the heat of passion, that is in anger: fear alone, even fear of
immediate death is not enough.
[T]he victim [must have been] . . . performing in the actual
presence of the accused some act which the accused did
genuinely believe, and which an ordinary person of the
community to which the accused belongs would genuinely
believe, to be an act of witchcraft against him or another person
under his immediate care.
A belief in witchcraft per se does not constitute a circumstance
of excuse or mitigation for killing a person believed to be a
witch or wizard when there is no immediate provocative act.
The provocative act must amount to a criminal offence under
[c]riminal [l]aw.
The provocation must be not only grave but sudden and the
127
killing have been done in the heat of passion.

2. Postcolonial Cases.
In the Tanzanian case Joseph
Kamiliango & Five Others v. R., four sisters arranged for an alleged
witch doctor to kill their other sister, Martina Adolf, who they
believed had used witchcraft to kill members of their family and to
128
make their father ill. Martina was brutally murdered, her body was
found with “a cut wound on the back of the head,” and her breasts,
genitals, and appendages had been mutilated.129 The four sisters
argued they had “acted under provocation arising out of their firm
belief that [Martina] was practicing witchcraft and was determined to
finish them off.”130 The appellate court judge found that Martina had
not provoked her four sisters, because they had the opportunity to
deliberate about how to kill her, after which they hired a witch doctor

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id.
Id. at 176–78.
1983 TLR 185 (CA).
Id. at 187.
Id. at 189.
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as an accomplice. Thus, the four sisters acted “with cool minds and in
131
The judge did not discuss the
full possession of their faculties.”
reasonableness of the four sisters’ belief in witchcraft, and he
dismissed the appeal of their convictions for murder outright.
In the Tanzanian case John N. Rudowiki v. Republic, the
defendant appealed his conviction for murder and his death sentence
for killing his grandfather.132 The defendant’s grandfather had come
to the defendant’s home and “threatened to kill him by witchcraft,
following which [the defendant] picked up an axe” and killed his
grandfather.133 The defendant maintained he had a genuine belief in
witchcraft, because “[o]n a number of occasions [he] had consulted
witchdoctors who told him that [his grandfather] had killed a number
of people in the family and had caused temporary sterility of his own
daughter through witchcraft, and on being asked [his grandfather
had] confirmed this.”134
The appellate court judge reduced the defendant’s conviction to
manslaughter and reduced his death sentence to twelve to a prison
term of twelve years. The judge found the defendant had been
shocked by his grandfather’s threat, especially in light of his
grandfather’s confession to have killed and caused misfortune to
several family members.135 The judge did not explicitly state whether
provocation based on a death threat that involves witchcraft was
reasonable, however, by taking into account the defendant’s genuine
belief in witchcraft, and the accused party’s perception of his
grandfather’s threat as real, the judge found the defendant was
reasonably provoked.136 According to the judge, the killing in this
case “was rooted in the belief of witchcraft which ought to be
discouraged. This was a bad case of manslaughter which came very
near murder, and which calls for a severe sentence.”137
In the Tanzanian case Herman Nyigo v. Republic, the defendant
appealed his conviction for murdering a person named Musa
Chatila.138 The defendant had gone to a tavern (pombe shop), where,
without warning, he killed Chatila by attacking him with a bamboo

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id.
1991 TLR 102 (CA).
Id. at 103.
Id.
Id. at 105.
See id.
Id. at 106.
1995 TLR 178 (CA).
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stick while Chatila was talking to another person. A witness heard
the defendant tell Chatila: “I am killing you because of your
139
sorcery.”
The appellate court judge rejected the defendant’s appeal for a
lesser conviction and denied his defense of provocation. The judge
agreed with the lower court, which had determined that provocation
was not involved because the defendant attacked Chatila without a
140
“quarrel or fight, in an unprovoked manner.”
The judge wrote: “The [defendant’s] utterances that he was
killing [Chatila] because of sorcery is in our view a clear
141
manifestation of malice aforethought.” The judge did not attempt
to determine if the defendant had a genuine belief in witchcraft. If
the judge’s reasoning followed a reasonable traditional African
standard, he might have viewed the defendant’s belief in witchcraft as
a mitigating factor in the case, especially if killing a witch was seen as
a praiseworthy service to the community as a whole, as discussed
above.142
These postcolonial Tanzanian cases are largely consistent with
trends in Ugandan law. The Uganda Penal Code’s requirement that
provocation be sudden prevents defendants from using the defense of
provocation in situations where “killers of the so-called witches take
considerable time brooding and nursing suspicions against their
victims. The victims, for their part, often say no word or do no overt
act to the accused that the law would recognize as sudden
provocation.”143
In reference to provocation, the Uganda Penal Code “requires
some physical and overt act or insult that is capable of derailing a
person’s fortitude and power of self-control and likely to induce him
to retaliate by killing the person who offers it. Metaphysical
phenomena, such as fears of witchcraft, are not such acts.”144 Thus, a
defendant who kills someone out of a genuine fear that the deceased
had bewitched him or her would not likely be able to avail himself or
herself of the defense of provocation in Uganda. It appears that
Ugandan law encourages judges to find that a genuine fear of
witchcraft does not constitute provocation. This is consistent with the
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id. at 179.
Id. at 180.
Id.
Supra note 9, and accompanying text.
Nsereko, supra note 108, at 52.
Id.
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colonial case Eria Galikuwa, which held that an “act causing . . . death
must be proved to have been done in the heat of passion, that is in
anger: fear alone, even fear of immediate death is not enough” to
constitute provocation.
C. Summary
The colonial era cases, discussed in Part III.B.1 above, come
from a period between the 1940s and 1950s and generally suggest that
when conventional defenses such as provocation are used by
defendants, they have generally been rejected by the courts. The
postcolonial cases, discussed in Part III.B.2 above, generally come
from the 1980s and 1990s. In the postcolonial era, judges seem to
145
have followed the colonial case Eria Galikuwa by allowing the
alleged appearance of witchcraft to count as provocation as long as
the killing is not premeditated, is sudden and is not based solely on
fear.
Trends in judges’ reasoning have followed the development of
the common law doctrine of provocation, since defendants are not
acquitted due to their beliefs in witchcraft, but rather their
convictions are sometimes reduced from murder to manslaughter,
and their sentences are adjusted accordingly. Since the late 1950s,
taunts unaccompanied by violence could constitute provocation in the
common law.146 Trends in cases involving witchcraft have followed a
similar path; since Kinene147 (1941) and Eria Galikuwa148 (1951), nonphysical acts have been considered adequate provocation under very
restricted circumstances.
IV. IMPUTATIONS OF WITCHCRAFT
Legal reasoning in the common law tradition places significant
importance on the concept of reasonableness, or what is “[f]air,
149
proper, or moderate under the circumstances.” In common law, the
concept of reasonableness appears in both the civil and criminal
branches of the law. In civil law, the reasonable person standard is
used as “a test of liability for negligence,” and defendants’ conduct is
often measured according to “reasonable care” or the “degree of care

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

1951 (18) E. Afr. Ct. App. 175 (appeal taken from Uganda).
See Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions v. Camplin, 1978 (2) All E.R. 168, 172–73 (H.L.).
1941 (8) E. Afr. Ct. App. 96 (appeal taken from Uganda).
Eria Galikuwa, 1951 (18) E. Afr. Ct. App. 175 (appeal taken from Uganda).
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1272 (7th ed. 1999).
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that a prudent and competent person engaged in the same line of
150
business or endeavor would exercise under similar circumstances.”
A reasonable person is a person who “acts sensibly, does things
without serious delay, and takes proper but not excessive
precautions.”151 The reasonable person standard also appears in
criminal law. Reasonableness was mentioned as early as 1803 in the
criminal law doctrine of self-defense,152 and in the mid-nineteenth
153
century, the reasonable man appeared in the law of provocation.
As seen in Part III.A above, the reasonable person standard is an
important part of the modern law of provocation.
According to Osborne M. Reynolds, Jr., the development of the
reasonable person standard “is generally thought to have been
necessitated by the difficulty of applying a constantly changing
standard based on individual capabilities and limitations, and the
need of those who live in society to expect and require that all others
behave, to some minimal extent, in a prescribed way.”154 The
reasonable person “possess[es] and exercis[es] those qualities of
attention, knowledge, intelligence and judgment that . . . society
require[s] of its members for the protection of their own interests and
the interests of others.”155 The personification of reasonableness in
the law helps to “constrain judicial decision-making by forcing judges
to consider the societal consensus embodied in the concept of
reasonableness when deriving results.”156
What follows is an analysis of judicial reasoning in cases
involving accusations or imputations of witchcraft. Generally, a
plaintiff claims that he or she suffered injury due to an accusation that
he or she is using witchcraft. Outside of Africa these cases tend to fall
under the law of defamation, but in South Africa and Zimbabwe such
imputations are criminal and judges generally seem to apply a
reasonableness standard in assessing injury.

150. Id. at 204.
151. Id. at 1273.
152. Donovan & Wildman, supra note 93, at 443.
153. Id. at 447.
154. Osborne M. Reynolds, Jr., The Reasonable Man of Negligence Law: A Health Report
on the "Odious Creature", 23 OKLA. L. REV. 410, 414 (1970).
155. Elmo Schwab, The Quest for the Reasonable Man, 45 TEX. B.J. 178, 178 (1982).
156. Robert Unikel, "Reasonable" Doubts: A Critique of the Reasonable Woman Standard in
American Jurisprudence, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 326, 329 (1992).
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A. Background
Before examining cases involving imputations of witchcraft from
South Africa and Zimbabwe, it is instructive to examine why
defamation is criminalized in these cases. Defamation is part of tort
law, otherwise known as the law of delict in the mixed common law
157
and Roman-Dutch legal systems in southern Africa. A delict is “a
wrong looked at from the individual’s point of view . . . [that] seeks to
regulate the relationships between individuals.”158 A crime “is a
159
Imputations of
wrong viewed from the perspective of the State.”
witchcraft are criminalized in both South Africa’s and Zimbabwe’s
Witchcraft Suppression Acts.160
According to South African legal scholar Jonathan Burchell, in
Roman-Dutch law private actions were historically penal in nature,
and “[a]n award of damages for defamation was more like a fine than
a recompense for the plaintiff.”161 Also, “criminal proceedings for
injury to reputation [i.e., defamation] were not confined to ‘serious’
cases,” and “the Roman-Dutch authorities did not take a clearly
defined line on whether criminal defamation was confined to the
more serious cases or not.”162
The Zimbabwean and former
Rhodesian courts have held that “the ‘seriousness’ of the defamation
163
Yet in South Africa, it is not clear
is an element of the offence.”
whether defamation must be “serious” in order to fall under criminal

157. The Roman-Dutch law tradition is the common law tradition of six Southern African
countries, two of which are South Africa and Zimbabwe. Roman-Dutch law was brought to
South Africa and Zimbabwe by the Dutch East India Company, which was given a charter by
the Estates-General, the highest authority in the Dutch Republic that lasted from 1581–1795.
As a Dutch possession, the Cape of Good Hope, located in what is now South Africa, received
the Roman-Dutch law from Dutch settlers.
From the end of the eighteenth century to the beginning of the twentieth century, the
British ruled the Cape, and British settlers brought influences of English law; however, RomanDutch law remained in place. The Cape system of law was eventually extended to British
protectorates, one of which was Rhodesia, or what is now Zimbabwe. Thus, the Roman-Dutch
law remains a major influence on the common law of South Africa and Zimbabwe. See
generally Richard Goldstone, The Reception of the Dutch-Roman Law in Southern Africa and
Sri Lanka, and its Influence on Civil Liberties, in LAW IN MULTICULTURAL SOCIETIES:
PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF LAW LIBRARIES MEETING,
JERUSALEM 21–26, 1985 (1989).
158. JONATHAN M. BURCHELL, PRINCIPLES OF DELICT 2 (1993).
159. Id.
160. §1(a) Witchcraft Suppression Act No. 3 of 1957 (South Africa); §3 Witchcraft
Suppression Act of 1890 (Ch. 9:19) (Zimbabwe).
161. JONATHAN A. BURCHELL, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION IN SOUTH AFRICA 323 (1985).
162. Id. at 325.
163. Id. at 326.
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law. Indeed, “neither the Roman-Dutch authorities nor the South
African cases provide an answer to the question whether defamation
164
must be ‘serious’ for criminal liability to result.”
Further, “[t]he South African and English law of criminal
defamation were originally influenced by the purpose of preventing a
165
breach of the peace.” Yet, “[l]ittle attention has been given to the
tendency of a statement to provoke a breach of the peace in the
South African authorities on criminal defamation, and a clear
distinction between ‘seriousness’ and a tendency to lead to a breach
166
of the peace has not always been drawn.” Burchell argues civil law
can provide adequate redress of damaged reputation and “the
criminal law of defamation both [in South Africa] . . . and in England
is seldom used,” suggesting that “it is too drastic a method for
controlling speech and expression.”167
Imputations of witchcraft are certainly serious in the context of
African societies, where accused witches are often killed. In many
African societies murdering a witch is not necessarily seen as a
deviation from expected behavior. In such cases, a judge would have
to take into consideration the genuineness of a defendant’s belief in
witchcraft and the reasonableness of the defendant’s crime according
to a reasonable person from the defendant’s community where such
witchcraft beliefs remain prevalent. According to Daniel D. N.
Nsereko, “[i]n Uganda, as is the case in many African countries,
witches or sorceresses are generally viewed with revulsion, fear, and
168
abhorrence. They are considered to be inhuman and not fit to live.”
Therefore, accusing someone of being a witch not only harms his or
her reputation, it puts his or her life in danger, thus warranting the
criminalization of witchcraft imputation.
In cases involving imputations of witchcraft, reasonableness
comes into play at two points. On the one hand, people who
genuinely believe in witchcraft might find it reasonable to think one
has an obligation to point out suspected witches. On the other hand,
accused witches would suffer injury to their reputations and likely
physical injury. A “modern” standard of reasonableness, the
reasonable person standard, would view accusations of witchcraft as
foolish and harmless. Neither imputing the use of witchcraft to
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id. at 327.
Id. at 330.
Id. at 330–31.
Id. at 332.
Nsereko, supra note 108, at 44.
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someone nor fearing injury from the community at large after an
imputation of witchcraft would make sense. Yet, the law and courts
in certain African countries take a slightly different view and
discourage accusations of witchcraft, likely because the state has an
interest in making people change their beliefs, while at the same time
recognizing that in communities of believers, such witchcraft
accusations or imputations can put the accused at risk.
Traditionally, imputations of witchcraft were not seen as criminal
in the communities of the parties involved in these cases and the
parties would have likely resolved their disputes through informal,
community-based, extra-judicial dispute resolution mechanisms.
Indeed, laws prohibiting the imputation of witchcraft are contrary to
some traditional community norms of what is seen as reasonable
conduct. By recognizing that these imputations cause harm in
communities where witchcraft beliefs are common, judges implicitly
modify the objective reasonable person standard to incorporate
traditional community norms.
In Zimbabwe, the national association of traditional healers
(Zinatha) challenged the Witchcraft Suppression Act’s punishment
for the imputation of the use of witchcraft.169 For many years,
“[m]embers of Zinatha have cried foul that the law [has] impinged
170
upon their right to expose evil-doers in their communities.”
Zinatha and other groups like it argue that “[i]t is time the Witchcraft
Suppression Act was revisited and those people who practise
witchcraft and sorcery should be punished.”171 In Zambia, “[t]he
Traditional Health Practitioners Association of Zambia (THPAZ)
urged Government to recognise the existence” of African witchcraft
and to amend the Witchcraft Act to legalize “witch-hunting.”172
B. Cases
The following criminal cases involve instances in which
defendants are punished for imputing the use of witchcraft. An
analysis of these cases will provide insight into whether the reasoning

169. Mclytton Cleaver, Sunday Opinion: About Crimes and Witches, ZIMBABWE STANDARD
(Harare), Apr. 12, 1998, available at http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/199804120017.html (on
file with Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law).
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Amend Witchcraft Act, Government Urged, TIMES OF ZAMBIA (Ndola) Apr. 23, 1998,
available at http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/199804230040.html (on file with Duke Journal
of Comparative and International Law).
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of African judges in witchcraft cases appears to follow a particular
standard of reasonable conduct, and whether any trends can be
discerned over time and across countries.
1. Zimbabwe. In the Zimbabwean case S. v. Bhumu, the
defendant, a witch doctor, was convicted of violating Section 3 of the
Witchcraft Suppression Act of 1890 for imputing the use of witchcraft
173
The witch doctor appealed his sentence of
to an elderly woman.
eight months’ imprisonment with labor. The appellate court judge
dismissed the appeal, holding the sentence was not excessive because
the defendant was an alleged witch doctor and as a result his
imputation was seen as particularly harmful, even though no harm to
anyone resulted from it. The judge viewed the imputation as
punishable because
the consequences of such an imputation can be disastrous for the
victim. Very often the unfortunate victim of the imputation is an
old woman who is then banished from the village, and is driven in
despair to suicide. Frequently she is severely assaulted and
sometimes even killed. Fortunately for her, these consequences did
not apparently overtake the complainant in this case, but they
174
could very easily have . . . .

The judge’s reasoning appears to follow a reasonable traditional
African standard. He accepts that imputations of witchcraft made by
witch doctors cause injury and he acknowledges that an accused witch
faces immediate danger. Yet, to a certain extent, the judge’s
reasoning also follows the reasonable person standard, in that he
upholds the witch doctor’s conviction for the act of imputing
witchcraft
Although judges often acknowledge that imputations of
witchcraft can cause harm, they generally dismiss actions not
grounded in actual harm. For example, in the Zimbabwean case S. v.
Pivisayi, the defendant, claimed that a woman used “fairies” to harass
175
The judge overturned the defendant’s
his wife and children.
conviction for imputing the use of witchcraft to the woman, because
according to the Witchcraft Suppression Act, the imputation must be
that the person used “non-natural means to cause disease or injury”176
and the judge held that the act of mere upsetting was not equivalent
to disease or injury. Yet, judges seem attentive to local opinion about
173.
174.
175.
176.

1981 (2) SA 839 (ZAD).
Id. at 841.
1982 (2) ZLR 260 (HC).
Id.

FINAL DIWAN.DOC

2004]

3/8/2005 9:44 AM

WITCHCRAFT: CONFLICT WITH LEGAL NORMS IN AFRICA

383

what constitutes reasonable behavior. In S. v. Ndhlovu, a school
principal claimed that a man caused a child’s illness (described in the
177
opinion as possession by a flock of magical birds). The judge found
the principal’s action to be in violation of the Witchcraft Suppression
Act, which states:
Whoever imputes to any other person the use of non-natural means
in causing any disease in any person or animal or in causing any
injury to any person or property, that is to say, whoever names or
indicates any other person as being a wizard or witch shall be guilty
178
of an offence.

The judge in Ndhlovu determined that the child “was regarded as
being ill by all concerned” in the controversy, and that given local
norms regarding witchcraft, injury had in fact resulted from the
179
principal’s imputation given local norms.
2. South African Conduit Pipe Cases. The South African cases
180
181
S. v. Nomgca and S. v. Mmbengwa & Others are similar to the
cases discussed above, however, the South African cases address
defendants utilizing the so-called “conduit pipe” defense. Under this
defense, by making an imputation of witchcraft, the imputor allegedly
acts as a mere “conduit pipe” or conveyor of information for
someone or something else.
In both of these South African cases, the judges rejected the
“conduit pipe” defense. The judges found acting as a conduit pipe for
an imputation of witchcraft to be a culpable act. In S. v. Nomgca, the
defendant had imputed witchcraft to a local woman claiming that a
spirit (mfufanyana) had appeared to him and told him that the local
woman was a witch who was trying to kill his wife.182 The judge
argued that the principle in such a “conduit pipe” case involving
imputations of witchcraft
is no different from that in cases of defamation. It is not an answer
for an editor of a newspaper to say “I merely published what X has
said and, if X says that the complaint or the plaintiff is a thief and I
publish that, I am not responsible because I am merely repeating
183
what somebody else said.”
177. 1984 ZLR 175 (SC).
178. Id. at 76 (quoting §3 Witchcraft Suppression Act of 1890 (Ch. 73)) (this statute was
amended in 2001. See supra note 25, for the amended text of Section 3).
179. Ndhlovu, 1984 ZLR at 179.
180. 1980 (2) SA 707 (TkSC).
181. 1988 (3) SA 71 (VSC).
182. Nomgca, 1980 (2) SA at 708.
183. Id. at 709.
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Thus, claiming to act as a conduit pipe does not relieve someone of
criminal liability for making an imputation of witchcraft. In reference
to a group of men accused of attacking an elderly woman after a child
claimed that he had been bewitched by the woman, the judge in S. v.
Mmbengwa & Others reasoned that
[b]y accepting [the child’s] express or implied indication of the
[elderly woman] as the person who had caused his illness through
the use of supernatural powers, and by acting on it in assaulting
[the elderly woman], [the group of men] imputed the cause of the
184
illness to her, quite apart from a verbal indication or pointing out.

In both of these conduit pipe cases, the judges refused to
consider the defendants’ genuine belief in witchcraft as a mitigating
factor. Instead, both judges focused on the potential harm an
imputation of witchcraft could cause an “imputee.” In S. v. Nomgca,
the judge wrote, “it seems to me irrelevant to the present appeal
whether [the defendant] believed in mfufanyanas or not.”185 The
judge was not concerned with the defendant’s belief in witchcraft, and
he focused on the principle that by transmitting the spirit’s message to
the woman, the defendant made an imputation of witchcraft.
C. Summary
Both Zimbabwe’s Witchcraft Suppression Act and Section 1(a)
of South Africa’s Witchcraft Suppression Act punish the imputation
186
of the use of unnatural means to cause disease or injury. The law in
both Zimbabwe and South Africa generally encourage judges to
follow a reasonable person standard that does not consider the
imputation of witchcraft to be reasonable behavior, however, by
recognizing the potential harm an imputation of witchcraft can cause,
the Witchcraft Suppression Acts do not regard these imputations as
mere silliness or nonsense. For example, in Zimbabwe,
[i]t is clear from the [Witchcraft Suppression] Act read as a whole
that the object is to suppress witchcraft in all its various
manifestations . . . The purpose behind the Act, therefore, appears
to be to suppress all those practices of witchcraft which are likely to
cause some injury to the unfortunate victim. It is true that the
object of the Act is to suppress witchcraft but the object of the
187
suppression is none-the-less [sic] to prevent injury to individuals.

184. 1988 (3) SA at 73.
185. Nomgca, 1980 (2) SA at 708 (emphasis added).
186. §3 Witchcraft Suppression Act of 1890 (Ch. 9:19) (Zimbabwe); §1(a) Witchcraft
Suppression Act No. 3 of 1957 (South Africa).
187. R. v. Hunda, 1956 (3) SA 696, 697 (S.R.).
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Judges’ reasoning in South African conduit pipe cases does not
take into account the imputor’s belief in the conveyed imputation of
witchcraft. Rather, the act of being a conduit pipe itself, regardless of
whether one believes in the message being conveyed, is seen as an
illegal imputation of witchcraft. In Nomgca, the judge’s likening of a
conduit pipe to a newspaper editor who publishes a defamatory
statement demonstrates how in conduit pipe cases, judges appear to
focus less on genuine belief in witchcraft and more on the
criminalization of imputation, regardless of a defendant’s intention.
The author was only able to locate two such conduit pipe cases, both
from South Africa. The likely existence of other conduit pipe cases
that are unreported or published in less widely circulated law reports
makes the trend found in the two cases discussed above tentative.
Conduit pipe cases may also be unreported in other African
countries.
V. CONCLUSION
This study of judicial reasoning demonstrates that while African
judges generally tend to give deference to state legal norms over
norms underlying popular beliefs when the two conflict, judges do not
give absolute superiority to such state legal norms. In some narrow
circumstances, witchcraft is considered a mitigating factor in judges’
decisions. It appears that African judges in witchcraft controversies
seek to establish the new normative orientations towards
modernization and western norms that have emerged in the
postcolonial period.
In general, during the postcolonial period, judges have avoided
admitting spectral evidence, and given significant consideration to
norms underlying popular beliefs when deciding cases involving
imputations of witchcraft and provocation. Perhaps this greater
consideration of popular norms in cases involving the defense of
provocation has been due to judicial reasoning following the
development of the common law doctrine of provocation. This
doctrine has seen an increase in the subjectivity of the reasonable
person standard, and the inclusion of acts that are not overtly physical
as reasonable provocation. Also, there could be a conscious effort by
judges to reconcile the conflict between norms underlying popular
beliefs and state legal norms, which is why judges have at times been
willing to reduce a murder conviction to manslaughter if the
defendant was reasonably provoked by an alleged act of witchcraft.
Similarly, the governments of South Africa and Zimbabwe view the
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imputations of witchcraft as having the potential to cause serious
harm, and as a result, the imputation of the use of non-natural means
to cause disease or injury has been criminalized. Here, state interests
tie directly into norms underlying popular beliefs, as the potential
threat that witchcraft imputations pose to social order is the likely
motivation for the law.
Southeastern Cameroonian judicial attitudes towards norms
underlying popular beliefs in witchcraft serve as an exception. These
judges have been particularly responsive to popular beliefs and local
norms, and they have generally subordinated state legal norms to
popular ones by basing their decisions on spectral evidence provided
by witch doctors. In responding to popular needs to curb the practice
of witchcraft, southeastern Cameroonian judges have gone too far, as
accused witches whose guilt is based on dubious spectral evidence
often receive harsh sentences. By subordinating state legal norms to
norms underlying popular beliefs, judges in southeastern Cameroon
have shown a reluctance to accept the new normative orientation that
has emerged in postcolonial African law.
The cases discussed in this article demonstrate the challenge a
new normative order can pose to preexisting popular norms—a
challenge that takes the shape of a conflict of norms that is played out
in the legal system where the two normative orientations clash head
on. To effectively reconcile old and new normative orientations,
particularly norms underlying popular beliefs with state legal norms,
the law should be responsive to serious needs and desires of a
community, comprehensible by the people who are affected by it and
comprehensive in providing solutions to legal problems that arise.188
The cases involving witchcraft discussed in this article have shown
that, with the exception of southeastern Cameroon, courts have not
been consistently responsive to popular opinion demanding that the
practice of witchcraft be curbed.
This note is intended to serve as an exploratory survey to provide
insight into the conflict between state legal norms and those norms
underlying popular beliefs. If solutions are not devised for the
effective reconciliation of the conflict between norms underlying
popular beliefs and state legal norms, the function of the law as an
effective mechanism of social control in regions where local witchcraft
norms remain salient will continue to pose a challenge. Granting
customary courts jurisdiction over certain types of witchcraft-related
188. WATSON, supra note 7.
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disputes in limited circumstances may provide one potential solution.
Alternatively, codification of customary law is another, less likely
option. Judges can also employ non-binding but authoritative texts
on customary law or texts that restate established state law that
provide insight into the manner judges have addressed witchcraftrelated legal issues in previous disputes as guidelines to follow when
norms underlying popular beliefs clash with state legal norms. The
integration of norms underlying cultural beliefs are integrated to
varying degrees by judges in African courts addressing witchcraftrelated disputes. In order to prevent state legal norms from being
perceived by many traditional Africans as illegitimate and foreign,
thus undermining the continued development of legal systems
throughout the region, state policies encompassing a more uniform
integration of underlying cultural norms is advocated.
Mohammed A. Diwan

